Boundary and interior equilibria: what drives convergence in a ‘beauty contest'?

We present an experimental game in the p-beauty framework. Building on the definitions of boundary and interior equilibria, we distinguish between ‘speed of convergence towards the game-theoretic equilibrium' and ‘deviations of the guesses from the game-theoretic equilibrium'. In contrast to earlier findings (Güth et al., 2002), we show that (i) interior equilibria initially produce smaller deviation of the guesses from the game-theoretic equilibrium compared to boundary equilibria; (ii) interior and boundary equilibria do not differ in the timeframe needed for convergence; (iii) the speed of convergence is higher in the boundary equilibrium.Guessing game, p-beauty contest, individual behaviour

Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can we Learn?

In this paper we address the topic of guessing games. By developing a generalised theory of naïveté, we show how Güth et al..s result (i.e. convergence toward interior equilibria is faster than convergence toward boundary equilibria) is compatible with Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour. However, we also show how, under new model parameterisation, neither Güth et al..s story of convergence towards interior equilibria, nor Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour are verified. We conclude that the results of Nagel (1995) and Güth et al. (2002), however interesting, are severely affected by the ad hoc parameterisation chosen for the game.game, p-beauty contest, individual behaviour

Simple model of herd behaviour, a comment

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model are its simplicity and the robustness of its results. Its weakness is that it is based on three tie-breaking assumptions, which according to Banerjee minimise herding probabilities. In this paper we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. Even if the overall probability of herding does not change dramatically, the results obtained, which differ from Banerjee's are the following: players' strategies are parameter dependent; an incorrect herd could be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible. There are, in addition, some several cases where available information allows players to find out which action is correct, and so an irreversible correct herd starts.Herd behaviour

Comparison of Mean-Variance theory and Expected-Utility theory through a Laboratory Experiment

In the 40’s and early 50’ two decision theories were proposed and have since dominated the scene of the fascinating field of decision-making. In 1944 – when von Neumann and Morgenstern showed that if preferences are consistent with a set of axioms then it is possible to represent these preference by the expectation of some utility function – Expected Utility theory provide a natural way to establish “measurable utility”. In the early 50’s Markowitz introduced the Mean-Variance theory that is the basis of modern portfolio selection theory. Even if both models were analyzed from virtually all possible point of view; although they were tested against several generalizations; even though they seams to be the most attractive theories of decision making, they were never testes gains each other. This paper will try to fill this gap. It investigates, using experimental data, which of these two models represent a better approximation of subjects’ preferences.Expected utility, Mean variance, preference functional, pair wise choice, experiments

On Price Data Elicitation: a Laboratory Investigation

There is abundant literature in experimental research on decision making under risk, which compares, and ranks subjects’ preferences on the basis of some elicitation method. The present paper performs a similar analysis in order to compare them. Since pricing data lead in many cases to some anomalies (i.e. status quo bias endowment effect) we examine three mechanisms to elicit price preferences: willingness-to-pay in a second price auction, willingness-to-accept in a second price auction, and certainty equivalent elicited with BDM. A Bayesian interpretation of our results suggests that it is not possible to state ex-ante the more appropriate elicitation method for a particular subject: for 1/3 of our sample WTP is preferred for 1/3 of our sample WTA is preferred and for the remaining 1/3 BDM is preferred.willingness-to-pay; willingness-to-accept; BDM; second price auction

Comparison of Mean-Variance Theory and Expected-Utility Theory through a Laboratory Experiment

In the 40's and early 50''s two decision theories were proposed and have dominated the scene of the fascinating field of decision-making. Since 1944 - when von Neumann and Morgenstern showed that if preferences are consistent with a set of axioms then it is possible to represent these preferences by the expectation of some utility function - Expected Utility theory provides a natural way to establish "measurable utility". In the early 50''s Markowitz introduced the Mean-Variance theory that is the basis of modern portfolio selection theory. Since then, both models were analyzed from virtually all possible points of view and were tested against several generalizations. However, these two models should be tested against each other. This paper tries to fill this gap, investigating (using experimental data) which of these two models better approximate subjects'' preferences.preference functional

SIMPLE MODEL OF HERD BEHAVIOUR, A COMMENT

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model are its simplicity and the robustness of its results. Its weakness is that it is based on three tie-breaking assumptions, which according to Banerjee minimise herding probabilities. In this paper we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. Even if the overall probability of herding does not change dramatically, the results obtained, which differ from Banerjee's are the following: players' strategies are parameter dependent; an incorrect herd could be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible. There are, in addition, some several cases where available information allows players to find out which action is correct, and so an irreversible correct herd starts.Herd behaviour

Financial Market in the Laboratory

This paper investigates experimentally a market inspired by two separate strands of economic literature. The first strand is that of herd behaviour in non-market situations and the second that of the aggregation of private information in markets. The first suggests that socially undesirable herd behaviour may result when information is private; the second suggests that in a market context the private information may be aggregated efficiently through the price mechanism. The latter literature therefore suggests that socially undesirable behaviour may be eliminated through the market mechanism. We tested this hypothesis experimentally, in a very simple extension of a herd model into a market context, and found that many of the stylised facts of financial markets (i.e. fat tails of the distribution of returns and autoregressive dependence in volatility) can be reproduced in our experimental market.herd behaviour, fat tail volatility clustering.

Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment

In this work, we conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test the findings of a theoretical environmental enforcement model played as a strategic game where the firm’s behavior is influenced by the course of actions discretionally undertaken by both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Our experimental findings suggest that the presence of the DOJ can be counterproductive in increasing social welfare, since it implies solely additional enforcement costs, which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance.classroom experiments, environmental enforcement, environmental economics

Eliciting environmental preferences of Ghanaians in the laboratory: An incentive-compatible experiment

In this paper we aim to look into the attributes of Ghanaians’ willingness-to-pay for green products. This would help us to assess whether Ghanaians show a preference towards environmental goods. The methodology employed to address these issues is an ‘experimentally-adapted’ CV survey which involves laboratory experiment conducted among Ghanaian University students. Notwithstanding the limitations arising from the sample used in our experiment (most notably University students do not represent, economically wise, the entire Ghanaian population), we believe that our investigation provides a first answer to such question as Ghanaians consistently show that they are willing to pay an extra premium for green products.contingent valuation, experiment, incentive-compatible, Ghana, organic products, willingness to pay